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The present study empirically examined a novel dual process model of self-reported
aberrant driving behavior in young and novice drivers that incorporates both impulsive
and self-regulatory processes. Four hundred and nine participants aged 18–25 years
(M age = 21.18 years, SD = 2.12; 65.5% females) completed online questionnaires on
impulsivity, normlessness, sensation seeking, emotion and self-regulation, and attitudes
toward driving safety. Path analysis showed that motor impulsivity was associated
with self-reported driving violations, errors, and lapses, whereas sensation seeking
was uniquely directly associated with self-reported errors. Non-planning impulsivity,
normlessness and sensation seeking had significant indirect effects on self-reported
errors, via self-regulation. Finally, motor impulsivity and normlessness had a significant
indirect effect on self-reported violations, errors and lapses, via attitudes to driving safety.
Based on our findings we suggest that a dual-process approach is relevant to the
study of aberrant driving behavior in young and novice drivers, and the results of the
present study have important implications for initiatives to promote driving safety in
this population.
Keywords: risky driving, young drivers, impulsivity, attitudes, self-regulation, driving violations, driving errors
INTRODUCTION
According to the 2016 World Health Organization report on road safety, over a million people
die in road traﬃc crashes (RTCs) each year, and traﬃc crash-related injuries represent the leading
cause of death among young people aged between 15 and 29 years (World Health Organisation,
2016). In the United Kingdom alone, 29,081 people were killed or seriously injured in 2017 in traﬃc
crashes, with an estimated cost of ∼£16 billion p.a. for reported crashes to the United Kingdom
economy (Department for Transport [DFT], 2018). Novice drivers are overrepresented in road
traﬃc casualties, with the per-mile crash rate for teenage drivers being 10 times higher than that
of more experienced and older drivers (Mayhew et al., 2003; McKnight and McKnight, 2003). The
Decade of Action for Road Safety (DARS) 2011–2020 represents a United Nations initiative that
aims to improve road safety and reduce by 50% the number of deaths attributed to traﬃc injuries
and RTCs, especially among young drivers. One of the key action areas of the global plan to achieve
the DARS 2011–2020 goals is road user behavior, according to the UN Road Safety Collaboration
(World Health Organisation, 2019). Accordingly, a recent evaluation of actual RTC data showed
that driver behavior was a main risk factor in 90% of the observed crashes (Dingus et al., 2016).
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Better understanding the driver-related risk factors for RTCs can
help in further promoting road safety in young drivers.
So far, a large body of research has shown that crash
involvement has been independently associated with
speciﬁc types of self-reported aberrant driving behavior,
such as intentionally violating traﬃc rules (e.g., speeding),
and unintentional driving errors and lapses (e.g., getting
into the wrong lane when entering a roundabout or a
junction) while driving (Lajunen et al., 2004; de Winter
and Dodou, 2010). Early research suggested that lapses
may have consequences for the driver but not for other
road users, errors and violations are often hazardous to
others, but only self-reported violations were associated
with crash involvement (Parker et al., 1995). However, a
recent meta-analysis (de Winter et al., 2015) showed that
the average correlation coeﬃcient between self-reported
violations and crash involvement was 0.13 (based on 67
studies), and the respective correlation with self-reported
errors was 0.09 (based on 56 studies), suggesting that
both types of self-reported aberrant driving represent risk
factors for self-reported RTCs. Previous research has shown
that although self-reported violations and errors represent
distinct facets of aberrant driving behavior (Lajunen et al.,
2004), the correlation between them can be as high as 0.70
(de Winter and Dodou, 2010). Further research into the
psychological factors associated with errors and violations
is needed in order to identify if similar mechanisms are
implicated in the prediction of these two types of self-reported
aberrant driving.
Direct and Indirect Effects of Personality
on Risky Driving
One of the most proliﬁc research areas in the psychological
study of aberrant driving behavior is concerned with the
inﬂuence of personality. Diﬀerent studies have found that
emotion-related traits, such as altruism, sensation and
excitement-seeking, and hostility were associated with riskier
self-reported driving behavior and higher self-reported crash
involvement among young and novice drivers (e.g., Ulleberg,
2001; Oltedal and Rundmo, 2006; Machin and Sankey, 2008;
Lucidi et al., 2010). Other research has shown that trait
impulsivity is particularly relevant to self-reported risky driving
in young and/or novice drivers. Impulsivity reﬂects people’s
tendency to act spontaneously and without premeditation
and forethought, in response to environmental cues or
other triggers, and with a preference for short-term and
immediate gratiﬁcation over long-term and delayed rewards
(Moeller et al., 2001). According to Barratt’s three-factor
model, trait impulsivity reﬂects three main characteristics:
greater motor activation (motor impulsivity), such as acting
at the spur of the moment; less attention to the task at
hand (attention impulsivity); and a reduced ability to
plan actions (non-planning impulsivity; Patton et al., 1995;
Stanford et al., 2009).
Constantinou et al. (2011) used Barratt’s three-dimensional
model of impulsivity (Patton et al., 1995; Stanford et al.,
2009) to study the associations between motor, attentional,
and non-planning dimensions of impulsivity with self-reported
risky driving in young drivers. They found that non-planning
impulsivity was positively associated with ordinary driving
violations. Another study (Hatﬁeld et al., 2017) used both self-
reported and lab-based objective measures of trait impulsivity
and showed that higher speeding and “riskier” responses (e.g.,
overtaking, driving through orange lights, not attending to
cyclists on the road) in a computerized driving simulation task
were positively associated with poorer performance in impulse
control tasks (i.e., more errors in a Go/No Go task), but
not with self-reported measures of trait impulsivity. Another
study found that impulsivity was associated with driving errors
(Pearson et al., 2013). Bıçaksız and Özkan (2016) reviewed
38 studies that included measures of trait impulsivity and
diﬀerent self-reported and police-recorded driving outcomes,
including driving errors, lapses, violations, driving under the
inﬂuence, and speeding. They found that, in most studies,
aberrant driving outcomes were signiﬁcantly associated with
impulsivity dimensions: “Among the 38 studies reviewed here,
impulsivity failed to relate signiﬁcantly to the driving related
measure in any analyses conducted in that study in only four
studies” (p. 215).
Previous research has supported the idea that impulsivity
and related personality traits are indirectly associated
with risky driving outcomes. Sümer (2003) suggested that
psychological characteristics, including risk-taking propensity,
aggression/hostility and sensation-seeking, create the tendency
for aberrant driving behavior (e.g., driving under the inﬂuence,
speeding, committing errors and violations) which, in turn,
can lead to actual crash involvement. The hypotheses
derived from Sümer’s (2003) model have been supported
by research using self-reported measures of risky driving in
young people (e.g., Constantinou et al., 2011). Ulleberg and
Rundmo (2003) proposed an alternative model that takes
a social cognitive approach and emphasizes the role of safe
driving attitudes as a mediator between personality traits and
self-reported aberrant driving behavior. According to this
model, personality traits related to impulsive behavior and
risk-taking, such as sensation seeking, hostility/aggression,
and normlessness (i.e., believing that socially unacceptable
behaviors are sometimes needed to achieve certain goals),
increase the likelihood for aberrant driving (e.g., speeding).
On the other hand, traits such as altruism are expected to
have a negative correlation with self-reported risky driving
and a positive correlation with attitudes toward traﬃc
safety. Ulleberg and Rundmo (2003) further argued that
personality traits are likely to have an indirect (vs. a direct)
eﬀect on risky driving outcomes, and their model recognizes
attitudes to safe driving as a key variable that mediates the
association between personality traits and aberrant driving
behavior. Their model has been empirically supported by
subsequent research studying older (Lucidi et al., 2014) and
professional drivers (Mallia et al., 2015). The type of traits
associated with self-reported risky driving, and the eﬀect sizes
of the direct and indirect associations between personality,
attitudes to safe driving, and risky driving indicators (i.e.,
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driving violations, errors, and lapses at wheel) have varied
from study to study.
A Dual-Process Model of Aberrant
Driving Behavior
A large body of psychological research has shown that human
behavior is not always the product of careful planning,
premeditation, and self-regulation of thought and action (Evans,
2008; Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Strack and Deutsch, 2015;
Melnikoﬀ and Bargh, 2018b). Rather, automatically activated
processes, triggered by apparently mundane environmental cues,
can elicit a wide range of unplanned and spontaneous behavioral
responses, spanning biased information-processing and social
judgments, normative behavior, stereotyping, interpersonal
violence and hostility, and risk-taking (Aarts and Dijksterhuis,
2003; Bargh et al., 2012; Rivis and Sheeran, 2013; Sheeran et al.,
2013; Melnikoﬀ and Bargh, 2018a). Using the terms coined
by Stanovich and West (2000), dual process theorists have
categorized automatically activated and consciously controlled
higher order cognitive processes into System 1 and System
2 respectively (Evans, 2008). According to this classiﬁcation,
System 1 reﬂects action driven by impulses, intuition, heuristics,
and low mental eﬀort, whereas System 2 is characterized by
higher cognitive eﬀort, reﬂective, and analytic thinking, and is
associated with our capacity to control impulses (e.g., inhibitory
control), and to regulate our thoughts, emotional arousal, and
actions - metaphorically, some scholars have respectively likened
System 1 and System 2 processes to “hot” and “cold” reasoning
and decision-making (Evans, 2008; Strack and Deutsch, 2015).
Although dual process theories were originally developed to
account for variations in human reasoning and decision-
making processes, the “dualism” concept has found useful
applications in other domains, such as understanding health
and risk-taking behaviors, and developing relevant interventions
to change them (Wills et al., 2011; Hollands et al., 2016;
Maher and Conroy, 2016).
The dual process paradigm is highly relevant to understanding
(and preventing) aberrant driving behavior in young and
novice drivers for the following reasons. Recent developmental
neuroscience and neurobiology perspectives posit that neural
networks located in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) do not mature
until early adulthood, and thus, adolescents and young adults
can lack suﬃcient inhibitory control to resist risk-taking, such as
antisocial behavior, substance use/abuse, unsafe sexual activity,
and reckless driving (e.g., Kuhn, 2006; Steinberg, 2007; Pharo
et al., 2011). This is unsurprising given that the PFC has
been described as the “command center” of multiple self-
regulatory functions such as inhibitory control, workingmemory,
attentional control and planning, and task switching – collectively
known as Executive Functions (EFs) – which are necessary
for safe and self-regulated driving (Mäntylä et al., 2009). In
addition to neurodevelopmental changes, adolescence and young
adulthood are characterized by greater autonomy/independence
and spending more time with peers. According to Steinberg
(2007, 2010) the still “immature” executive control network
cannot suﬃciently inhibit impulses and actions driven by the
highly active socio-emotional network, which can result in
higher risk-taking in the presence of peers. Chein et al. (2011)
demonstrated that adolescents, but not adults, committed more
errors in a driving-related impulse control (Go/No Go) task
when they were tested in the presence of peers, but the
amount of errors was not statistically signiﬁcant between age
groups when they were tested alone. Furthermore, in the peer
condition, adolescents exhibited greater activation in the brain
regions associated with reward valuation (e.g., ventral striatum,
orbitofrontal cortex or OFC), and less activation of executive
control areas, as compared to adults, and this pattern of activation
was signiﬁcantly associated with greater risk-taking (Chein et al.,
2011; Albert et al., 2013).
Other studies using driving simulators have examined the
association between EF and driving behavior. One study found
that young adults with weaker working memory (updating
component) performed worse in a lane changing task during a
low-ﬁdelity driving simulation (Mäntylä et al., 2009), and another
study found that lower response inhibition was associated with
more collisions and slower reaction times to hazards in a
medium ﬁdelity driving simulation task (Ross et al., 2015). More
recently, Ross et al. (2016) extended their previous research
by using a dual process paradigm. They assessed the eﬀects
of peer presence on driving performance, and its interaction
with executive functions, such as inhibitory control. They
found that the presence of peers was associated with greater
traﬃc violations in a driving simulation task - a ﬁnding that
corroborates previous research on the association between the
presence of same-age peer passengers and actual RTCs among
young and novice drivers (e.g., Simons-Morton et al., 2011).
Ross et al. (2016) further demonstrated that driving violations
(e.g., speeding) in the peer presence condition were higher
among drivers with lower inhibitory control. To date, the
studies by Ross et al. (2015, 2016) are the only ones that
have explicitly used a dual system approach to evaluate risky
driving in young people using driving simulation tasks. Ross
et al. (2016) manipulated peer presence as a primary means to
resemble System 1 processes. Peer presence, however, represents
the (social) stimuli that may elicit System 1 responses, such as
increased risk-taking, and does not necessarily reﬂect System
1 responses per se. Another study showed that neural activity
in brain areas involved in response inhibition and cognitive
control (i.e., System 2) buﬀered the eﬀects of peer presence
on impulsive risk-taking (System 1) in driving simulation tasks
among recently licensed teenage drivers (Cascio et al., 2015).
This suggests that System 2 processes play an important role
in the way System 1 processes may inﬂuence (simulated)
driving behavior.
The distinction between System 1 and System 2 may also
provide a useful framework on which to model the cognitive
bases of driving errors, such as getting into the wrong lane,
while driving. Many aspects of car control are likely to rely
on the more automatic processes of System 1. However, the
avoidance of errors (or lapses) may often require intervention
from System 2 at key choice points, in order protect behavior
from following the most frequently applied routines in the
current situation (Reason, 1990). Impulsivity, and its often
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identiﬁed correlate, inattention, may impinge on System 2
input of this sort.
The Present Study
Previous research has indicated that a dual process paradigm can
be used to better understand the psychological factors associated
with RTCs in young and novice drivers (Mäntylä et al., 2009;
Ross et al., 2015, 2016). In the present study we propose a
dual process model of aberrant driving behavior in young and
novice drivers that is diﬀerentiated from previous dual process
studies of risky driving (i.e., Ross et al., 2016) in terms of
methodology and theoretical framework. Speciﬁcally, unlike Ross
et al. (2016) who utilized a driving simulator, in the present
study we assessed aberrant driving behavior with the Driving
Behavior Questionnaire (DBQ; Lajunen et al., 2004), a self-
reported measure of aberrant driving that has been found to be
reliably and validly associated with RTC risk (e.g., near crashes),
and self-reported traﬃc crashes in diﬀerent cultures and age
groups (for a meta-analysis see de Winter and Dodou, 2010; de
Winter et al., 2015), and with driver performance in studies using
driving simulation tasks (Helman and Reed, 2015). Furthermore,
our theoretical proposition is that a dual process paradigm of
risky driving in young and novice drivers should take into
consideration individual diﬀerences that are implicated in System
1 and System 2 processes. These may include impulsivity and
related traits (System 1), and self-regulatory capacities (System
2; e.g., emotion and self-regulation).
Our dual-process model is based on three key premises.
The ﬁrst premise is that System 1 (hot) processes are reﬂected
in individual diﬀerences in impulsivity, sensation-seeking and
normlessness, which have been previously associated with self-
reported aberrant driving behavior (Ulleberg and Rundmo, 2003;
Constantinou et al., 2011; Bachoo et al., 2013; Berdoulat et al.,
2013; Sullman and Stephens, 2013). Accordingly, System 2
(cold) processes are reﬂected in individual diﬀerences in self-
regulation (i.e., the capacity to consciously control behavior and
restrain impulsive action, Carver and Scheier, 2016), emotion
regulation (i.e., the capacity to regulate emotional responses
in order to achieve a certain goal), and attitudes toward
driving safety, which have been previously associated with
lower scores in self-reported aberrant driving (Iversen and
Rundmo, 2004; Sani et al., 2017). The second premise of our
model is that the distinction between System 1 and System
2 processes respectively resembles the distinction between risk
and protective psychological factors for RTCs. This implies
that “hot” input from System 1 processes is likely to increase
the risk for RTCs, whereas “cold” self-regulatory System 2
processes can mitigate that risk. The third and ﬁnal premise
purports that the eﬀects of impulsivity traits on driving
behavior may be mediated by individual diﬀerences in self-
regulation (see Cascio et al., 2015).To illustrate, young and
novice drivers with higher scores in impulsivity and related
traits (e.g., sensation-seeking) may respond more emotionally
to an environmental cue (e.g., being overtaken) while driving.
Whether this emotional response will predict aberrant driving
behavior (e.g., driving violations and/or errors) and actual crash
involvement will be determined by the driver’s capacity to
regulate their thoughts, emotions, and actions and by their
attitude toward driving safety - which is hypothesized to be
lower in individuals with higher scores in personality traits and
characteristics pertaining to System 1, such as impulsivity. With
this example the dual-process model of risky driving proposed in
the present study explains how impulsivity and impulsiveness-
like traits (System 1) are associated with risky driving, and
how their eﬀects can be “overtaken” by self-regulatory and
reﬂective processes (System 2). The premises of our model are
partly derived from previous theories of self-regulation and
impulse control, which purported that self-regulatory failure
emerges when the impulsive urges and emotions originating
in subcortical structures (i.e., nucleus accumbens/NAcc) cannot
be eﬀectively regulated because of diminished self-regulation
(i.e., prefrontal activity) due to decision fatigue/ego depletion,
negative moods and other inﬂuences (e.g., cue exposure;
Heatherton and Wagner, 2011).
Based on the aforementioned premises, the following
hypotheses were formed.
H1: Trait impulsivity (motor, executive, and planning
dimensions), sensation seeking, and normlessness (System
1) will be positively associated with self-reported aberrant
driving behavior. Accordingly, self-regulation, emotion
regulation and attitudes toward driving safety (System 2)
will be negatively associated with aberrant driving behavior.
H2: Emotion, self-regulation, and attitudes to driving safety
(System 2) will signiﬁcantly mediate the association
between trait impulsivity dimensions, sensation seeking,
normlessness (System 1) and aberrant driving behavior.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Overall, 409 students from three Universities in North and
South-East England participated in the study. They were aged
between 18 and 25 years (M age = 21.18, SD = 2.12). 65.5%
of them identiﬁed themselves as females, 87.5% identiﬁed
themselves as having English/Welsh/Scottish/Norther Irish or
British background, their average (median) mileage per week
was 20 miles, and the average (mean) time since obtaining their
driving license was 7.6 years (SD = 2.07).
Measures
System 1 Measures
Impulsivity was measured with the Abbreviated Impulsiveness
Scale (ABIS; Coutlee et al., 2014). The ABIS is an 11-item
measure of trait impulsivity and consists of three subscales
that reﬂect attentional (e.g., “I don’t pay attention”), motor
(e.g., “I say things without thinking”), and non-planning
(e.g., “I am future oriented” reverse scored item) impulsivity.
Responses are coded on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = rarely/never,
4 = almost always/always). Following reverse scoring of 8 items,
a mean score is computed for each subscale and higher scores
indicate higher impulsiveness. In the present study, the internal
consistency reliability coeﬃcient (Cronbach’s α) for each ABIS
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subscale was acceptable (ABIS non-planning α = 0.71; ABIS
motor α = 0.71; ABIS attention α = 0.71).
Sensation-seeking was assessed with the mean of ﬁve items
based on the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa and McCrae,
1992). Responses were recorded on a 5-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), and higher scores
reﬂected higher sensation-seeking. Two items (“I act in a direct
way” and “I would never go hang gliding or bungee jumping”) were
deleted to improve the internal reliability of the measure, and the
ﬁnal 3-item measure had satisfactory reliability (α = 0.66).
Normlessness was measured with the mean score of three
items (e.g., “It is ok to get round laws and rules as long as
you do not break them directly” and “If something works, it
is less important whether it is right or wrong”) based on Kohn
and Schooler (1983) normlessness scale, and adapted from Chen
(2009) who used this measure in the study of aberrant driving
behaviors. Responses were recorded on a 5-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), and higher scores
reﬂected normlessness. Internal consistency reliability for this
measure was satisfactory (α = 0.73).
System 2 Measures
Emotion regulation was assessed with the Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross and John, 2003). The ERQ is a 10-
item self-reported survey that measures individual diﬀerences in
emotion regulation strategies. It comprises two subscales that
reﬂect expressive suppression (e.g., “I control my emotions by
not expressing them”) and cognitive reappraisal (e.g., “When I
want to feel positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change
what I’m thinking about”). Responses are given on 7-point scale
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), and a mean score
is computed for each scale with higher scores reﬂecting higher
emotion regulation in each dimension. The reliability and validity
of the ERQ have been reported in previous studies (Gross and
John, 2003), and the internal consistency reliability for the ERQ
subscales in the present study was high (Cognitive reappraisal
α = 0.87; Expressive suppression α = 0.75).
Self-regulation was assessed with the 31-item Short Self-
Regulation Questionnaire (SSRQ; Carey et al., 2004). The SSRQ
reﬂects diﬀerent aspects of self-regulation, such as goal-setting
and monitoring (e.g., “I set goals for myself and keep track of
my progress”), deliberate thinking/reasoning of actions (e.g., “I
usually think before I act”), and self-control (e.g., “I am able
to resist temptation”). Responses were recorded on a 5-point
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), and a sum
score was generated with higher scores indicating greater self-
regulatory capacity. The reliability of the SSRQ in the present
study was high (α = 0.91).
Attitudes to driving safety were assessed with the respective
measure developed by Iversen (2004). This is a 16-item self-
reported questionnaire of attitudes toward traﬃc violations (e.g.,
“Many traffic rules must be ignored to ensure traffic flow”), careless
driving of others (e.g., “It’s OK to ride with someone who speeds if
others do”), and driving under the inﬂuence (e.g., “I would never
drive after drinking alcohol”). Responses were recorded on a 5-
point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree) and
a mean score was computed with higher scores denoting more
positive attitudes toward driving safety. The internal consistency
reliability of the measure was high (α = 0.81).
Driving Behavior Measure
Aberrant driving behavior was assessed with the 27-item version
of theManchester Driver Behavior Questionnaire (DBQ; Lajunen
et al., 2004), which measured driving violations (11 items, of
which 8 items assessed ordinary violations and 3 items assessed
aggressive violations), driving errors (e.g., “On turning left nearly
hit a cyclist who has come up on your inside” - 8 items) and
lapses (e.g., “Misread the signs and exit from a roundabout on
the wrong road” - 8 items). For driving violations, ordinary
(e.g., “disregard the speed limit on a motorway”) and aggressive
violations (e.g., “Sound your horn to indicate your annoyance
to another road user”) were combined into a single score of
“total violations” based on previous research showing that these
dimensions could reﬂect a single factor (e.g., Lajunen et al., 2004),
and that aggressive violations do not predict crash involvement
independently from ordinary violations (Rowe et al., 2015).
Respondents were asked to indicate how often they themselves
do each of the violations and errors when driving over the last
12 months or since passing their driving test if that was less
than 12 months. Responses were recorded on a six-point scale
from “Never” to “Nearly all the time.” Composite scores were
computed for each subscale, and higher scores denoted more
frequent engagement in each type of aberrant driving behavior.
Internal consistency reliability was satisfactory for total violations
(α = 0.82), errors (α = 0.76), and lapses (α = 0.72).
Design/Procedure
A cross-sectional, survey-based design was used to assess the
association between System 1 (impulsivity, sensation-seeking,
and normlessness), System 2 (emotion regulation, self-regulation,
and attitudes to driving safety) and aberrant driving behavior.
Participants were contacted either in-person by a trained research
associate in University premises, or online through email lists for
research participation, and were asked to access and complete
an online Qualtrics survey about driving attitudes and behavior.
No time restrictions were posed for survey completion and
participants took approximately 15 min to complete the online
survey. In line with the research ethics guidelines of the British
Psychological Society, participants gave their informed consent
for participation in the study (by selecting an option in the
online survey indicating their agreement to proceed with the
study before starting the questionnaire), they were duly informed
about the aims and purposes of the study and were given
the right to withdraw from it at any point without giving
explanations and without any ensuing negative consequences.
They were also informed about the anonymity and conﬁdentiality
of their responses and were given the opportunity to resolve
any questions they had prior to completing the survey. Ethics
approval was obtained by the respective ethics review board of
the University of Sheﬃeld.
Data Analysis
Initial inter-correlations (Pearson’s r) among study variables were
calculated in SPSS v. 24 (IBMCorp., Armonk, NY, United States).
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Following this a path model was estimated in AMOS v. 24 (IBM
Corp., Armonk, NY, United States) to test the study hypotheses,
featuring the variables that signiﬁcantly correlated with the
outcome variables (i.e., lapses, errors, and violations). The path
model included System 1 traits as exogenous predictors, System 2
traits as potential mediators, and the three outcome variables and
modeled the regression parameters simultaneously. Error terms
for all endogenous variables were permitted to correlate. Given
that the outcome variables were correlated, average eﬀects of each
of the predictors on the three outcomes were estimated, as well as
the diﬀerences in the size of these eﬀects using AMOS custom
estimands. Bootstrapping (10,000 resamples; Wood, 2005) was
used to estimate the signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients in the path model
(Hayes and Scharkow, 2013). Bootstrapping is incompatible with
missing data, so a complete case analysis was conducted (n = 307).
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among the study
variables are presented in Table 1. The observed correlations
were in the expected direction for all measures, thus, supporting
the construct validity of the measures used in the study.
Taking System 1 measures as an example, sensation seeking was
positively correlated with normlessness (r = 0.24, p < 0.001),
attentional (r = 0.17, p < 0.005), motor (r = 0.30, p < 0.001),
and non-planning (r = 0.20, p < 0.001) impulsivity. Age was not
statistically related to any outcome variable, nor were the emotion
regulation variables, and thus these variables were omitted from
further analyses.
The results of the path model are in Table 2. This model ﬁt the
data well, χ2(2) = 0.027, p = 0.986, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00,
p = 0.994, and this set of predictors explained 17%, 25%, and
42% of variance in the three outcomes, lapses, errors, and
violations, respectively. Of the System 1 traits, motor impulsivity
was signiﬁcantly directly associated with all three outcomes
with coeﬃcients of a similar magnitude, while sensation seeking
was statistically uniquely directly associated with self-reported
driving errors. Of the System 2 traits, attitudes was signiﬁcantly
negatively directly associated with all outcome variables, but with
a statistically meaningful stronger association with violations
than either errors or lapses.
Of the indirect (mediation) eﬀects of System 1 traits via System
2 traits on driving outcomes, non-planning, normlessness,
and sensation-seeking all had a signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect on
reported driving errors via self-regulation, and these eﬀects were
statistically stronger than the same indirect eﬀects on reported
driving violations. Motor impulsivity and normlessness both had
signiﬁcant indirect eﬀects on all outcomes via attitudes, and these
eﬀects were statistically stronger for reported driving violations
than errors or lapses.
DISCUSSION
The present study purported the idea that a dual process
paradigm is relevant and useful to the study of the psychological
risk factors for RTCs in young and novice drivers - an
idea that has started to gain prominence in risky driving
research over the last 5 years (see Lambert et al., 2014). We
used the System 1/ System 2 distinction (Evans, 2008) to
classify impulsivity and impulsiveness traits (i.e., normlessness,
and sensation seeking), and self-regulatory capacity (i.e.,
emotion and self-regulation, and attitudes toward driving
safety) respectively, as independent psychological correlates
of self-reported driving violations, driving errors and lapses.
Accordingly, we hypothesized that self-reported aberrant driving
behavior will be positively associated with System 1 and
negatively associated with System 2 psychological factors. Our
second hypothesis was that the association between System 1
psychological factors (i.e., impulsivity, sensation seeking and
normlessness) and self-reported driving behavior (i.e., errors,
lapses, and violations) would mediated by self-regulation and
attitudes to safe driving, which pertain to System 2 processes.
Overall, the results of the study have largely supported our
hypotheses in the following ways.
First of all, motor impulsivity was associated with all three
indicators of aberrant driving (i.e., self-reported violations,
driving errors and lapses). Motor impulsivity reﬂects behavioral
disinhibition (e.g., acting without thinking) and has been
associated with impaired inhibitory control (Caswell et al.,
2013). Impaired inhibitory control, in turn, has been associated
with greater inﬂuence of peers on risk-taking in driving
simulation tasks among young novice drivers (Ross et al.,
2016). Our study corroborates previous ﬁndings and indicates
that motor impulsivity (behavioral disinhibition) is more
relevant to aberrant driving behavior in young and novice
drivers, than other dimensions such as executive (non-planning)
and cognitive impulsiveness. However, our ﬁndings are in
contrast with Constantinou et al. (2011) who found that non-
planning impulsivity was the only signiﬁcant correlate of driving
violations. A possible explanation is that the association between
non-planning impulsivity and self-reported aberrant driving in
Constantinou et al. (2011) was attenuated by the inclusion of
other predictors, such as sensitivity to punishment/reward and
diﬀerent measures of sensation seeking. Another explanation
pertains to the methodological approach used by Constantinou
et al. (2011). Speciﬁcally, although the zero-order correlations
between motor impulsivity and the three dimensions of self-
reported aberrant driving were statistically signiﬁcant (Pearson’s
r ∼0.17 to 0.27) and comparable to those of non-planning
impulsivity (Pearson’s r ∼0.09 to 0.22), the authors decided to
include only non-planning impulsivity in their path model.
Furthermore, in the present study, the observed eﬀect sizes
in the zero-order correlations between sensation seeking and
normlessness are in line with those reported in previous research
in the context of risky driving in young people (e.g., Lucidi
et al., 2010); sensation seeking was associated with driving errors,
and normlessness and sensation seeking both had signiﬁcant
indirect eﬀects, via self-regulation, on driving errors. Higher
scores in sensation seeking may predispose young drivers to
seek excitement in driving, which may, in turn be associated
with more driving errors (e.g., braking too quickly on a slippery
road) or other risky driving indicators, such as speeding (Machin
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among the study variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
(1) Violations – 0.55∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.14∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.15∗ −0.06 0.04 −0.16∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗
(2) Errors – 0.56∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.01 0.04 0.31∗∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.05 0.06 −0.24∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗
(3) Lapses – 0.01 0.11∗ 0.04 0.27∗∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.12∗ 0.11∗ −0.08 −0.08 −0.20∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
(4) Age – 0.06 0.08 −0.02 −0.02 −0.09 −0.03 −0.14∗ 0.10 −0.11∗ 0.11∗ −0.03
(5) Sex – 0.00 −0.11∗ −0.14∗ 0.02 −0.15∗ −0.07 0.05 −0.27∗∗∗ 0.07 0.25∗∗∗
(6) Mileage – 0.02 −0.06 −0.02 0.15∗ 0.02 −0.01 0.04 0.05 −0.02
(7) Motor impulsivity – 0.30∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.02 −0.23∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗
(8) Planning impulsivity – 0.50∗∗∗ 0.15∗ 0.20∗∗∗ −0.14∗ 0.00 −0.40∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗
(9) Attentional
impulsivity
– 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.57∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
(10) Normlessness – 0.24∗∗∗ 0.06 0.22∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗
(11) Sensation seeking – 0.16∗∗ 0.05 −0.04 −0.16∗∗
(12) Reappraisal – −0.00 0.31∗∗∗ 0.06
(13) Suppression – −0.15∗ −0.19∗∗∗
(14) Self-regulation – 0.28∗∗∗
(15) Attitudes –
Mean 1.85 1.54 2.18 21.18 – 54.24 1.95 1.95 1.99 2.51 3.54 4.69 3.89 108.23 3.69
SD 0.59 0.42 0.58 2.12 – 89.57 0.54 0.61 0.50 0.88 0.74 1.12 1.23 16.55 0.56
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.001; ∗∗p ≤ 0.005; ∗p ≤ 0.05.
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TABLE 2 | Path model results for the direct and indirect effects of system 1 traits on self-reported aberrant driving behavior.
(A) Lapses. R2 = 0.17, p = 0.010 (B) Errors. R2 = 0.25, p = 0.012 (C) Violations. R2 = 0.42, p = 0.006 Average effect
Direct effects β BCa 95% CI β BCa 95% CI β BCa 95% CI β BCa 95% CI
LO HI LO HI LO HI LO HI DIFF
Gender 0.19∗∗ 0.08 0.30 0.09 −0.03 0.20 0.02 −0.08 0.11 0.10∗ 0.01 0.18 A > C
Mileage 0.11 −0.04 0.24 0.04 −0.05 0.14 0.17∗∗ 0.06 0.27 0.11∗ 0.01 0.20 B < C
(1) Motor impulsivity 0.20∗∗ 0.06 0.34 0.26∗∗∗ 0.11 0.41 0.22∗∗ 0.10 0.35 0.23∗∗∗ 0.11 0.35
(2) Attention 0.06 −0.10 0.22 −0.01 −0.17 0.14 0.00 −0.14 0.14 0.02 −0.10 0.14
(3) Non-planning 0.00 −0.13 0.14 0.00 −0.11 0.11 0.02 −0.09 0.13 0.01 −0.09 0.10
(4) Normlessness −0.04 −0.18 0.09 0.02 −0.13 0.16 0.12† −0.01 0.23 0.03 −0.08 0.14 A < C
(5) Sensation-seeking 0.03 −0.10 0.15 −0.17∗ −0.30 −0.04 −0.03 −0.15 0.08 −0.06 −0.17 0.05 A | C < B
(6) Self-regulation −0.10 −0.24 0.04 −0.13† −0.26 0.00 0.04 −0.07 0.16 −0.06 −0.16 0.04 B > C
(7) Attitudes −0.20∗∗ −0.32 −0.07 −0.32∗∗∗ −0.47 −0.16 −0.46∗∗∗ −0.57 −0.34 −0.32∗∗∗ −0.43 −0.21 A | B < C
Indirect effectsa
(1)→(6) 0.00 −0.02 0.01 0.00 −0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.01
(2)→(6) 0.05 −0.02 0.14 0.07† 0.00 0.15 −0.02 −0.09 0.04 0.03 −0.02 0.09 B > C
(3)→(6) 0.01† 0.00 0.05 0.02∗ 0.00 0.05 −0.01 −0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 A | B > C
(4)→(6) 0.02 −0.01 0.05 0.02∗ 0.00 0.05 −0.01 −0.03 0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.03 B > C
(5)→(6) −0.01 −0.04 0.00 −0.02∗ −0.05 0.00 0.01 −0.01 0.03 −0.01 −0.03 0.00 B > C
(1)→(7) 0.03∗∗ 0.01 0.07 0.05∗∗ 0.01 0.10 0.07∗∗ 0.02 0.13 0.05∗∗ 0.01 0.10 A | B < C
(2)→(7) 0.02† 0.00 0.05 0.03 −0.01 0.07 0.04 −0.01 0.10 0.03 −0.01 0.07
(3)→(7) 0.01 −0.02 0.03 0.01 −0.03 0.05 0.02 −0.04 0.07 0.01 −0.03 0.05
(4)→(7) 0.09∗∗ 0.03 0.15 0.14∗∗∗ 0.07 0.22 0.20∗∗∗ 0.14 0.27 0.14∗∗∗ 0.08 0.20 A | B < C
(5)→(7) 0.00 −0.03 0.02 −0.01 −0.05 0.03 −0.01 −0.06 0.04 −0.01 −0.04 0.03
Total effectsa
(1) 0.23∗∗ 0.09 0.36 0.31∗∗∗ 0.16 0.44 0.30∗∗∗ 0.16 0.42 0.28∗∗∗ 0.16 0.39
(2) 0.13† −0.01 0.26 0.09 −0.04 0.21 0.02 −0.11 0.14 0.08 −0.03 0.18
(3) 0.02 −0.11 0.15 0.03 −0.08 0.14 0.03 −0.09 0.14 0.03 −0.07 0.12
(4) 0.06 −0.06 0.18 0.17∗∗ 0.06 0.28 0.31∗∗∗ 0.19 0.40 0.18∗∗∗ 0.09 0.26 A < B < C
(5) 0.01 −0.11 0.14 −0.20∗∗ −0.32 −0.07 −0.03 −0.16 0.09 −0.07 −0.18 0.03 A | C < B
N = 307. χ2(2) = 0.027, p = 0.986, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00, p = 0.994. aAnalyses control for the effects of gender on the mediators and DVs, and mileage on the DV. BCa 95% CI = Bias-corrected and accelerated
bootstrap confidence intervals (10,000 resamples). DIFF = Tests of equivalence between parameters for DV (A), (B), and (C). or = parameters are significantly different at p < 0.05. | = parameters are not significantly
different at p < 0.05. Bootstrapped significance tests are based on standardized coefficients. ∗∗∗p < 0.001. ∗∗p < 0.01. ∗p < 0.05. †p < 0.10.
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Lazuras et al. Dual-Process Model of Risky Driving
and Sankey, 2008). Previous research has shown that sensation
(or thrill) seeking is associated with both driving violations
and driving errors (Jonah, 1997; Wishart et al., 2017). In line
with a recent meta-analysis (Zhang et al., 2019), in the present
study sensation seeking had a signiﬁcant but weak correlation
with self-reported violations. It is possible that the correlation
between sensation-seeking and aberrant driving behavior turns
non-signiﬁcant when a multivariate model is examined that
accounts for the eﬀects of other predictors.
We further hypothesized that the eﬀects of impulsivity
and related traits (normlessness and sensation seeking) on
aberrant driving behavior will be mediated by System 2 self-
regulatory processes. The results supported this hypothesis.
Speciﬁcally, attitudes toward driving safety mediated the
associations of motor impulsivity and normlessness with self-
reported driving errors, lapses and violations. Accordingly,
self-regulation mediated the associations of motor impulsivity,
normlessness and sensation seeking with driving errors. Our
ﬁndings further extend previous research by highlighting
the roles of safe driving attitudes and trait self-regulation
in mitigating the risk for aberrant driving among young
drivers with higher scores in behavioral disinhibition
(motor impulsivity). In particular the mediation results
would suggest that those with higher System 1 traits are
likely to have lower scores in characteristics and traits
pertaining to System 2 that would function to regulate their
driving behavior.
Self-regulated driving has been mostly studied in the
context of older drivers and in association with age-related
risk-avoidance and cognitive failure (e.g., Sullivan et al.,
2011; Meng and Siren, 2012). To the authors’ knowledge,
our study is among the ﬁrst to report on the eﬀects
of self-regulation on self-reported aberrant driving behavior
among young and novice drivers. The present ﬁndings
indicate a protective eﬀect of self-regulation against driving
errors, and further showed that the potential risk for traﬃc
crashes that may be posed by impulsive driving can be
mitigated by higher scores in driving safety attitudes and self-
regulation. It is noteworthy that self-regulation and impulsivity
may be related but they represent distinct psychological
constructs that have separate functions, neural pathways
and developmental trajectories (Hofmann et al., 2012; Nigg,
2017; Steinberg et al., 2018). Furthermore, our ﬁndings
corroborate past research where better executive functions
were associated with reduced risk-taking and risky driving
in driving simulation tasks (Mäntylä et al., 2009; Ross
et al., 2015). Executive functions play an important role in
self-regulatory capacity (Hofmann et al., 2012; Nigg, 2017),
and researchers have argued that executive functions allow
people to pursue goal-directed behaviors and self-regulate their
actions (Dohle et al., 2018). Accordingly, on the basis of
the present ﬁndings we suggest that self-regulation may be
an important explanatory factor in the association between
executive functions and driving behavior (e.g., Mäntylä et al.,
2009; Ross et al., 2015). It is also possible that the eﬀects of
impulsivity on driving behavior are inﬂuenced by individual
diﬀerences in executive functions and self-regulation (Hofmann
et al., 2012). However, these hypotheses require further
empirical investigation.
The present study is not free of limitations. First of all, we
used self-reported measures for impulsivity and aberrant driving
behavior. Although self-reported aberrant driving may be subject
to socially desirable responses, a large body of research has shown
that the DBQ has been signiﬁcantly associated with self-reported
traﬃc crashes driving behavior in studies using driving simulators
(de Winter et al., 2015). Furthermore, signiﬁcant associations
were observed between certain impulsivity dimensions (i.e.,
motor impulsivity/behavioral disinhibition) and self-reported
aberrant driving behavior, and these associations could be
examined further with the use of lab-based measures of
impulsivity, and more objective measures of risky driving
(e.g., valid observations/reports of traﬃc crashes). Secondly,
our study assessed mostly personality traits that reﬂect System
1 (i.e., impulsive/hot) and System 2 (i.e., controlled/cold)
processes. Future studies should incorporate more expansive
measures that reﬂect broader System 1 (e.g., attentional bias
to emotional stimuli) and System 2 reasoning and decision-
making processes, such as risk perceptions. This will improve our
understanding of automatic and reﬂective traits and processes
involved in aberrant driving behavior, and will also lend
further support to the idea that a dual process paradigm is
needed in order to better understand and more eﬀectively
prevent risky driving among young and novice drivers (see
Lambert et al., 2014). Also, in our study we used general
measures of emotion and self-regulation and the observed
eﬀects could be stronger if driving-speciﬁc measures were
used. Future studies, therefore, may consider the development
of driving-speciﬁc measures of emotion and self-regulation
(e.g., measures that will reﬂect how well drivers regulate
their aggressive thoughts, emotions and action while driving).
Finally, we used a cross-sectional design and this poses
the inherent problem of reverse causality. Future studies
should incorporate a longitudinal design to determine the
developmental trajectories of the associations observed in
the present study.
With respect to the practical implications of our ﬁndings,
researchers have recently emphasized the need to reduce health
risk-taking by addressing both reﬂective and automatic processes
in reasoning and decision-making (Marteau et al., 2012). We
further argue that the time is ripe to consider a dual system
approach to risky driving and, accordingly, inform driving safety
interventions. Our study showed that the eﬀects of impulsive
action can be mitigated by safe driving attitudes and self-
regulation. Although future studies are needed to further validate
our ﬁndings, interventions for driving safety should consider
emphasizing the importance of driving safety attitudes, impulse
control and self-regulation in mitigating the risks for RTCs
among young and novice drivers.
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